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CONGRESS TRIPS OVER
INTERNATIONAL LAW: WTO FINDS
UNFAIRNESS IN MUSIC LICENSING ACT
Mary LaFrance*
I. INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property law reform in the United States frequently
involves balancing the interest fights of holders against the
interests of users. As international agreements play an
increasingly important role in the development of domestic
intellectual property law, striking this balance has become a more
complicated process.
Whereas, a few decades ago, resolving the competing needs of
owners and users often could be accomplished purely as a matter
of domestic policy -- whether the outcome was based on high-
minded principle, interest group politics, or simple pragmatism --
today the proposed resolution to such a conflict more often than
not must be tested against the United States' international
obligations under a growing list of trade agreements and
intellectual property conventions.
A recent example of this phenomenon, and the focus of this
article, involves Congress's 1998 decision to narrow the scope of
the exclusive public performance right in non-dramatic musical
compositions (e.g., "pop" music) by significantly broadening one
of the longstanding exceptions to that right. This decision was of
dubious merit purely as a matter of domestic policy; as discussed
below, the amendment was largely the result of special interest
lobbying by the hospitality industry.
* Professor of Law & Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, William S. Boyd
School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. The author would like to
thank the Federal Bar Association and the Clark County Bar Association for the
opportunity to present an earlier version of this essay, and the William S. Boyd
School of Law for its continuing research support.
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What domestic politics can do, however, it seems that
international politics can undo. As the story of the expanded
"homestyle exemption" continues to unfold, it appears that this
relatively unprincipled amendment will be short-lived, not because
our elected representatives have recognized the error of their ways,
but because international law -- and the enormous political
constituencies that have influenced that law -- will offer Congress
no choice but to repeal or significantly curtail this broadened
exemption.
Yes, Virginia, interest group politics now speaks with a global
voice.
II. THE 1976 ACT'S HOMESTYLE EXEMPTION
The "homestyle exemption" made its first appearance in the
Copyright Act of 1976.2 Prior to that, under the Copyright Act of
1909,3 a copyright owner's public performance right4 was not
subject to any explicit exceptions for background music used by
small businesses. However, in the case of musical compositions,
the 1909 Act gave copyright owners the exclusive right to perform
the work "publicly for profit,"5 thus allowing unlicensed nonprofit
public performances to take place.
2 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17
U.S.C. § 101 etseq.) (hereinafter the "1976 Act").
3 Act of March 4, 1909, c.320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (repealed by 1976 Act)
(hereinafter the "1909 Act").
4 17 U.S.C. §§ 1 (c) - (e) (repealed by 1976 Act). Subsection (c) recognized the
public performance right with respect to certain nondramatic literary works;
subsection (d) recognized the right with respect to dramas; and subsection (e)
recognized the right with respect to musical compositions See, e.g., Buck v.
Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 200, 51 S.Ct. 410, 75 L.Ed. 971
(1931), finding an unauthorized public performance under section l(e) where a
hotel with a single radio receiver retransmitted unlicensed radio broadcasts of
copyrighted music to its public rooms as well as to the individual guest rooms).
Both subsections (c) and (e) gave the copyright owner an exclusive right only
with respect to for-profit uses of the work; only subsection (d) encompassed
public performances without regard for profit.
Id. §1(e).
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In the waning days of the 1909 Act, the Supreme Court held in
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken 6 that no unauthorized
public perfonnance occurred when a small fast-food restaurant,
with a seating capacity of 38-40 patrons, played an authorized
radio broadcast of music for its customers. The Court relied in
part on its prior decisions holding that mere reception of a licensed
broadcast was not itself a public performance for purposes of
section l(e).7 The Court noted the "practical unenforceability" of
a rule that would impose infringement liability on every small
business that had a radio or television on its premises.8 Further,
the Court noted:
[A] ruling that a radio listener "performs" every
broadcast that he receives would be highly inequitable for
two distinct reasons. First, a person in Aiken's position
would have no sure way of protecting himself from liability
for copyright infringement except by keeping his radio set
turned off. For even if he secured a license from ASCAP, 9
he would have no way of either foreseeing or controlling
the broadcast of compositions whose copyright was held by
someone else. Secondly, to hold that all in Aiken's
position "performed" these musical compositions would be
to authorize the sale of an untold number of licenses for
what is basically a single public rendition of a copyrighted
work. The exaction of such multiple tribute would go far
6 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 95 S.Ct. 2040, 45
L.Ed.2d 84 (1975).
7 Id. at 160-61 (citing Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U.S. 390, 88
S.Ct. 2084, 20 L.Ed. 2d 1176 (1968); Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394,
94 S.Ct. 1129,39 L.Ed. 2d. 415 (1974)). The court distinguished Jewell-
LaSalle as involving a broadcast that was itself unlicensed. Aiken, 422 U.S. at
160. That ground for distinction is not terribly persuasive, however, since the
only issue in Jewell-LaSalle was whether the hotel's actions constituted a public
performance, not whether that performance was infringing.
8 Id. at 162.
9 The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers ("ASCAP")
issues "blanket licenses" that permit licensees to publicly perform any
copyrighted musical compositions owned by ASCAP's membership, which
consists of music publishers and composers.
2001] 399
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beyond what is required for the economic protection of
copyright owners, and would be wholly at odds with the
balanced congressional purpose of 17 U.S.C. § l(e):
The main object to be desired in expanding copyright protection
accorded to music has been to give the composer an adequate
return for the value of his composition, and it has been a serious
and difficult task to combine the protection of the composer with
the protection of the public, and to so frame an act that it would
accomplish the double purpose of securing to the composer an
adequate return for all use made of his composition and at the
same time prevent the formation of oppressive monopolies, which
might be founded upon the very rights granted to the composer for
the purpose of protecting his interests.
On the heels of the 1975 Aiken decision, Congress quickly
drafted what became known as the homestyle exemption,
incorporating it as section 110(5) of the bill that was ultimately
enacted as the 1976 Copyright Act." At the same time, Congress
broadened the scope of the copyright owner's exclusive rights to
include most not-for-profit public performances.' 2 Thus, Congress
10 Aiken, 422 U.S. at 162-64 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60'h Cong., 2d Sess.
7 (1909)).
11 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1976 & Supp. 1994) (prior to 1998 amendments). For a
contemporaneous discussion of the history and scope of this provision, see
Bernard Korman, Performance Rights in Music under Sections 110 and 118 of
the 1976 Copyright Act, 22 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 521, 528-534 (1977).
12 Under the 1976 Act, the owner of a copyrighted music work has the
exclusive right "to perform the copyrighted work publicly." 17 U.S.C. § 106 (4)
(2001). The House Report on the 1976 Act explained that:
The right of public performance under section 106(4) extends
to 'literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works
and sound recordings' and, unlike the equivalent provisions
now in effect, is not limited by any 'for profit' requirement.
The approach of the bill, as in many foreign laws, is first to
state the public performance right in broad terms, and then to
provide specific exemptions for educational and other
nonprofit uses. This approach is more reasonable than the
outright exemption of the 1909 statute. The line between
commercial and 'nonprofit' organizations is increasingly
400 [Vol. xi:397
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overruled Aiken's holding that performing a radio broadcast for
customers was not a public performance, 13 but created a specific
exemption for certain such performances.' 4  The original
homestyle exception, which was not amended from 1976 until
1998, was brief:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section
106, the following are not infingements of
copyright:
(5) Communication of a transmission
embodying a performance or display of a
work by the public reception on a single
receiving apparatus of a kind commonly
used in private homes, unless --
(A) a direct charge is made to see or hear
difficult to draw. Many 'non-profit' organizations are highly
subsidized and capable of paying royalties, and the
widespread public exploitation of copyrighted works by
public broadcasters and other noncommercial organizations is
likely to grow. In addition to these trends, it is worth noting
that performances and displays are continuing to supplant
markets for printed copies and that in the future a broad 'not
for profit' exemption could not only hurt authors but could
dry up their incentive to write.
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94h Cong., 2d Sess. 62-63 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5816 (hereinafter House Report).
13 The House Report expressly noted, "[t]his basis for the [Aiken] decision is
completely overturned by the present bill and its broad definition of 'perform' in
section 101." House Report, supra note 12, at 86. See also Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482, 1487-88 (7 th Cir. 1991) (noting
that 1976 Act rejected Aiken's rationale but not its result).
14 See Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini, 55 F.3d. 263, 267 (7kh Cir. 1995).
2001]
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the transmission, or
(B) the transmission thus received is further
transmitted to the public.
15
According to the 1976 House Report, the purpose of section
110(5) was ". . to exempt from copyright liability anyone who
merely turns on, in a public place, an ordinary radio or television
receiving apparatus of a kind commonly sold to members of the
public for private use."
16
The basic rationale of this clause is that the secondary use of the
transmission by turning on an ordinary receiver in public is so
remote and minimal that no further liability should be imposed. In
the vast majority of these cases no royalties are collected today,
and the exemption should be made explicit in the statute. 17
The House Report described the scope of the exemption as
follows:
Under the particular fact situation in the Aiken case,
assuming a small commercial establishment and the
use of a home receiver with four ordinary
loudspeakers grouped within a relatively narrow
circumference from the set, it is intended that the
performances would be exempt under clause (5).
However, the Committee considers this fact
situation to represent the outer limit of the
exemption, and believes that the line should be
drawn at that point. Thus, the clause would exempt
small commercial establishments whose proprietors
merely bring onto their premises standard radio or
television equipment and turn it on for their
customers' enjoyment, but it would impose liability
where the proprietor has a commercial 'sound
'5 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1976 & Supp.1994) (prior to 1998 amendments).
16 
Rdt17 House Report, supra note 12, at 86.
402 [Vol. xi:397
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system' installed or converts a standard home
receiving apparatus (by augmenting it with
sophisticated or extensive amplification equipment)
into the equivalent of a commercial sound system.
Factors to consider in particular cases would
include the size, physical arrangement, and noise
level of the areas within the establishment where
the transmissions are made audible or visible, and
the extent to which the receiving apparatus is
altered or augmented for the purpose of improving
the aural or visual quality of the performance for
individual members of the public using those
areas.
18
In adopting the final language of section 110(5), the Conference
Committee Report added:
With respect to section 110(5), the conference
substitute conforms to the language in the Senate
bill. It is the intent of the conferees that a small
commercial establishment of the type involved in
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S.
151 (1975), which merely augmented a home-type
receiver and which was not of sufficient size to
justify, as a practical matter, a subscription to a
commercial background music service, would be
exempt. However, where the public
communication was by means of something other
than a home-type receiving apparatus, or where the
establishment actually makes a further transmission
to the public, the exemption would not apply.19
'
8 Id. at 87.
1 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1733, 94e Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 5816 (hereinafter "Conference Committee
Report").
2001]
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The limited scope of the exemption was further emphasized in the
Senate Report, which noted that "[t]he 110(5) exemption will
allow the use of ordinary radios and television sets for the
incidental entertainment of patrons in small businesses and other
establishments, such as taverns, lunch counters, hairdressers, dry
cleaners, doctors' offices, etc."
20
The general principle underlying the homestyle exemption,
including its limited scope, was -- and remains -- sound.
Broadcasters pay licensing fees to organizations representing
composers and music publishers for the privilege of publicly
performing copyrighted musical compositions.21 Those fees are
based on the revenues that the broadcaster derives from these
performances. Since most radio broadcasters derive revenues from
their advertising fees, the cost of public performance licenses for
radio stations is based on their advertising revenues. The
advertising fees are usually based on the anticipated listenership.
However, when these broadcasts are received in commercial
establishments, and used to enhance the profitability of a hotel,
restaurant, bar or retail establishment by providing an inducement
for customers to linger and spend money, the money spent by
those customers does not benefit the broadcaster, and therefore
cannot be considered in calculating the broadcaster's licensing fee.
As a result, the composers and publishers who, under section
106(4), should be entitled to receive a share of any profits derived
from the public performance of their music, receive no additional
compensation that would reflect the profits which their music may
have (at least indirectly) generated for the commercial
establishment where the broadcast was received. Unless the true
listenership, and the profits which businesses derive from making
music available to their patrons, can be estimated with some
20 S. Rep. No. 93-983, 93d Cong., 2d. Sess. 130 (1974) (hereinafter "Senate
Report").
21 Those performing rights organizations include the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast Music, Inc., (BMI),
and SESAC, Inc. (the smallest of the three). While foreign copyright owners
are typically represented by foreign performing rights organizations, the latter
usually have reciprocity arrangements with the United States organizations.
See, Al Kohn & Bob Kohn, KOHN ON MUsIC LICENsING 300-01, 871-73 (1996).
[Vol. xi:397404
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reasonable degree of accuracy, calculating appropriate blanket
licensing fees, and thus the appropriate distribution of royalties to
copyright owners, is extremely difficult. Any estimate of true
listenership that purports to include patrons of commercial
establishments is likely to be disputed by the broadcasters whose
blanket licensing fees are increased as a result of such estimates,
although it might be argued that the broadcasters can use those
same estimates to justify increasing their advertising rates, thus
passing the licensing costs on to advertisers. However, if the
licensing fees also take into account the revenues received by
businesses that are making broadcasts available to their customers,
those fees are likely to increase significantly, making it extremely
difficult for broadcasters to recoup the costs from advertisers. In
short, there is a pool of profits captured by businesses that is able
to attract and retain customers through the use of background
music, and to the extent that this pool of profits is attributable to
exploiting copyrighted works, the copyright owners have a
reasonable claim to some share of those profits. The problem is
how to determine that share, and how and from whom to collect
it.
2 2
The original homestyle exemption was designed to carve out a
small exception for some business users of broadcast music --
those businesses that did not derive significant revenues from the
incidental public performance of such music -- while leaving the
majority of business users to negotiate appropriate public
performance licenses. Unfortunately, in the years which followed
the enactment of section 110(5), the inconsistency between the
rather imprecise statutory language and the statements of intent in
the accompanying House, Senate, and Conference Committee
Reports led to increasing confusion over the scope of the
22 Compare Laura A. McCluggage, Section 110(5) and the Fairness in Music
Licensing Act: Will the WTO Decide the U.S. Must Pay to Play?, 40 IDEA: J.L.
& TECH. 1, 37-39 (2000) (noting that Canada law does not require
establishments to pay royalties for playing radio broadcasts, but does provide
for collecting additional performance royalties from radio stations based on their
listenership) with Laurence R. Heifer, World Music on a U.S. Stage: A
Berne/TRIPs and Economic Analysis of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, 80
B.U. L.REv. 93, 188-90 (2000) (criticizing the broadcaster-pays approach).
2001] 405
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exemption. In particular, courts were unable to reach a consensus
on which factors should be considered in determining whether a
particular establishment qualified for the exemption. For example,
the Seventh and Eighth Circuits focused exclusively on whether
the establishment's sound system complied with the statutory
requirement of "a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly
used in private homes.23 Other courts, including the Second and
Ninth Circuits, considered a variety of other -factors that had been
mentioned in the legislative history of section 110(5) -- for
example, the square footage of the establishment (in some cases,
specifically comparing its square footage with the supposed square
footage of the restaurant in Aiken), the number of patrons it could
23 E.g.,Edison Bros. Stores, Inc. v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 954 F.2d 1419, 1422-
24 (8"' Cir. 1992) (exemption applied where store used only a simple receiver
and two speakers; physical size of establishment, number of stores in chain, and
ability to pay for commercial music service were not decisive; statutory
language did not limit exemption to "small commercial establishments,"
notwithstanding legislative history; apparatus must be evaluated on a per-store
basis, without regard to apparatus at other stores in same chain), cert. denied,
504 U.S. 930, 118 L.Ed.2d 590,112 S.Ct. 1995 (1992); Cass County Music Co.
v. Muedini, 55 F.3d 263, 265-269 (7"h Cir. 1995) (exemption applied to
restaurant with music audible throughout its 1500 square foot dining area, and
capacity of 128 patrons; court focuses solely on nature of receiving apparatus);
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482 (71' Cir. 1991)
(nature of individual store's receiving apparatus is the only relevant factor,
regardless of whether store is independent or part of a chain) (affirming
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1324 (N.D. Ill.
1991)), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 911, 118 L.Ed.2d 547, 112 S.Ct. 1942 (1992);
NFL v. McBee & Bruno's, Inc., 792 F.2d 726, 731 (8"' Cir. 1986) (bar's
receipt of television broadcasts was not exempt because satellite dish was "not
commonly found in private homes"); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Jeep Sales &
Service Co., 747 F. Supp. 1190, 1193-94 (E.D.Va. 1990) (auto dealership was
not exempt where it used at least four indoor and four outdoor speakers; court
does not indicate square footage, focusing solely on the receiving apparatus, but
also cites cases that did consider square footage); National Football League v.
Rondor, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 1160 (N.D. Ohio 1993) ("deep fringe antennas with
preamplifiers and rotors are not commonly used in private homes"); Blue Seas
Music, Inc. v. Fitness Surveys, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (fitness
club was nonexempt where it imposed a direct admission charge, used a non-
home-type system with more than 13 speakers, and signal was further
transmitted "throughout the facility").
[Vol. xi:397
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accommodate at one time, its revenues, whether it was an
independent operation or part of a chain, and whether, in light of
these factors, the establishment was, in the words of the
Conference Committee Report, "of sufficient size to justify, as a
practical matter, a subscription to a commercial background music
service. ' 2 4  Although each of these diverse approaches was
24 E.g., Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc., 668 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 945, 72 L.Ed. 2d 468, 102 S.Ct. 2012 (1982). The Sailor
Music opinion asserts, without support, that the fast food restaurant in Aiken
covered 1055 square feet, of which 620 square feet were open to public. Id. at
86. However, as later pointed out by the court in Edison Stores, 954 F.2d at
1423 n.5, there is no record of this square footage in any of the published
opinions inAiken, or in the legislative history of section 110(5). Sailor Music
held that a Gap store that was 2769 square feet in size was not exempt under
section 110(5) because of its physical size, citing both the House and
Conference Committee Reports. Although the court also noted that the store in
question used four loudspeakers, it did not indicate the relevance of this
information. See also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Calvin's Furniture and
Appliances, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7566, at *9-*10 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (stores
with 5000 square feet open to public, and between 9 and 30 speakers, were
nonexempt regardless of whether the appropriate test is limited to their receiving
apparatus or considers the size of the establishment as well); U.S. Songs, Inc. v.
Downside Lenox, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 1220, 1222, 1226 (N.D.Ga. 1991)
(exemption applies only if there is no direct admission charge or "further
transmission," and only if the venue is "a small commercial establishment";
defendant's bar/restaurant was not exempt because disseminating radio signal
from receiver behind bar to "separate bar and dining areas" of unspecified size
constituted further transmission, and because defendant's equipment, which
included 20 speakers, was not home-type); Crabshaw Music v. K-Bob's of El
Paso, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 763, 766-67 ( W.D. Tex. 1990) (restaurant was not
exempt where it had 7000 square feet of dining area, commercial-type sound
system with eleven speakers, and $800,000-$900,000 in annual revenues);
Gnossos Music v. Di Pompo, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1539, Copy. L. Rep. (CCH)
P26,483, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15988, *13-*14 (D. Maine 1989) (restaurant
with 1824 square feet open to the public, and seating capacity of 172, was too
large compared to Aiken, and sound system was too commercial, with eight to
ten speakers; music was further transmitted from one room to speakers in other
rooms; and defendant had previously subscribed to commercial music service);
Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mont. 1990)
(restaurant with seating area of 1192 square feet, with the transmission audible
in an area of 880 square feet and seating capacity of 120 persons is too large,
compared to 620 square feet of public area in Aiken; sound system was also
commercial in nature, with five speakers; sound was "further transmitted" to
2001] 407
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public rooms other than the room where the receiver was located; court
indicated revenues would be relevant but defendant did not supply any data);
Merrill v. Bill Miller's Bar-B-Q Enter., Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1172, 1175-76 (W.D.
Tex. 1988) (chain of 36 restaurants with 1000-1500 square feet of dining space
per store, seating space for 100-125 people per store, over $500,000 in annual
gross revenues per store, and over $30 million in annual gross revenues chain-
wide, was not exempt; receiving apparatus was not home-type, even though it
had only two speakers; performance was "further transmitted" from one room to
another, and store was large enough to justify subscription to commercial music
service); International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 665 F. Supp. 652, 656-58
(N.D. Ill. 1987) (nightclub was not exempt where it had at least 2,640 square
feet, annual net profits of $35,000 to $136,000, seating capacity of 200, and
commercial sound system with eight speakers, and where the transmissions
were further transmitted to the public through wiring from a private office to the
public areas of the establishment), affd 855 F.2d 375 (7h Cir. 1988); Merrill v.
County Stores, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1164, 1170 (D.N.H. 1987) (hardware stores
not exempt where music reached 13,000 square feet open to public; apparatus
included 16-19 speakers and was not home-type, and stores had $2.5 million in
annual retail sales); Rodgers v. Eighty Four Lumber Co., 617 F. Supp. 1021,
1022-23 & n.1 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (chain of stores was not exempt because sound
system was commercial, using three to eight speakers, sound was further
transmitted from office to public areas, and each store had over 10,000 square
feet open to public); Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc. 602 F. Supp. 1113,
1118-1119 (M.D. N.C. 1985) (Miniature golf course covering 7500 square feet
was exempt; it was not large enough to justify subscription to commercial music
service because it was open only 6 months a year, and rarely had revenues of
more than $1000 a month; it also used a sound system, with six outdoor
speakers, that was not very audible due to the size and outdoor setting of the
golf course); Lamminations Music v. P&X Markets, Inc., 1985 Copyright L.
Dec. P25, 790, 1985 WL 17704 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (chain of grocery stores, each
with 10,000 to 14,500 square feet open to the public, was large enough to justify
subscribing to commercial music service; two had already used such services;
music was "further transmitted"; and equipment was not homestyle, using six to
ten speakers per store); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. United States Shoe Corp., 678
F.2d 816, 817 (9th Cir. 1982) (comparing square footage inAiken, and
concluding that chain of more than 600 Casual Comer stores was nonexempt
because it exceeded the "outer limit" of the exemption both in the nature of its
sound system as well as the "size and nature" of the retail operation, citing the
House and Conference Committee Reports) (affirming 211 U.S.P.Q. 43 (C.D.
Cal. 1980)).
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supportable by drawing on either the statutory language of section
110(5) or its legislative history, 25 the different approaches made it
impossible to articulate a uniform rule with predictive value.
In addition, courts found themselves wrestling with the more
technical questions of (1) whether each defendant's particular
"receiving apparatus" was "of a kind commonly used in private
homes," in light of rapid changes in home entertainment
technology 26 and the wide variety in types and numbers of
speakers employed at various establishments, and (2) whether the
broadcast, once received at the establishment, was "further
transmitted" within the meaning of the section 110(5), in light of
the vague definition of "transmitted" in section 101.28
25 Commentators have already addressed a number of these interpretative
problems. See, e.g., John Wilk, Seeing the Words and Hearing the Music:
Contradictions in the Construction of17 U.S.C. Section 110(5), 45 RUTGERS
L.REV. 783, 807-11 (1993); McCluggage, supra note 21, at 12; Peggy H. Luh,
Pay or Don't Play: Background Music and the Small Business Exemption of
Copyright Law, 16 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. J. 711, 727-34 (1996).26 E.g., NFL v. McBee & Bruno's, Inc., 792 F.2d 726, 731 (8' h Cir. 1986)
(finding bar not exempt because satellite dishes were not, at that time,
"commonly found in private homes"); National Football League v. Ellicottville
Gin Mill, Inc., 1995 WL 737935, *3, *6 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (refusing to issue
injunction against establishment that received locally blacked-out broadcast
from a distant location using a common roof-top antenna); National Football
League v. Rondor, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 1160 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (finding bar not
exempt because "deep fringe antennas with preamplifiers and rotors are not
commonly used in private homes"). See Wilk, supra note 24, at 805 (noting the
problem of applying section 110(5) to continually changing consumer
technology); Luh, supra note 24, at 727-30 (similar).27 See supra notes 22 - 23.
28 For example, several district courts have held that further transmission of a
broadcast occurred where the signal was received in one room in the
establishment, and was then transmitted through wires to loudspeakers located
in other rooms in the establishment. Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F.
Supp. 1031 (D. Mont. 1990); Gnossos Music v. Di Pompo, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1539, Copy. L. Rep. (CCH) P26,483, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15988,
*13-*14 (D. Maine 1989); Merrill v. Bill Miller's Bar-B-Q Enterprises, Inc., 688
F. Supp. 1172, 1175-76 (W.D. Tex. 1988); Red Cloud Music Co. v.
Schneegarten, Inc., 1992 WL 535955, *1 (C.D.Cal. 1992). In addition, courts in
at least two cases have held that "further transmission" occurred where a
broadcast was sent to speakers scattered throughout an establishment, even
though the opinions do not indicate whether the speakers and receiver were
2001] 409
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actually in different rooms. See Blue Seas Music, Inc. v. Fitness Surveys, Inc.,
831 F. Supp. 863 (N.D.Ga. 1993) (fitness club was nonexempt where it imposed
a direct admission charge, used a non-home-type system with more than 13
speakers, and signal was further transmitted "throughout the facility"); U.S.
Songs, Inc. v. Downside Lenox, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 1220, 1222, 1226 (N.D.Ga.
1991) (exemption applies only if there is no direct admission charge or "further
transmission," and only if the venue is "a small commercial establishment;"
defendant's bar/restaurant was not exempt because disseminating radio signal
from receiver behind bar to "separate bar and dining areas" constituted further
transmission, and defendant's equipment, which included 20 speakers, was not
home-type).
The Seventh Circuit appears to have rejected this broad interpretation of "further
transmission." Although that circuit affirmed a district court decision applying
this interpretation in International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d. 375,
378 (7h Cir. 1988) (affirming 665 F. Supp. 652 (N.D. 111. 1987), the appellant in
that case had not appealed the district court's infringement finding. When
presented with this issue a few years later in Claire's Boutiques, the Seventh
Circuit expressly rejected the argument that sending a signal to a speaker in
another room is a "further transmission," holding that "[t]o further transmit a
performance must mean more than to run speaker wire through a wall. It must
entail the use of some device or process that expands the normal limits of the
receiver's capabilities." 949 F.2d at 1495. The Seventh Circuits reasoning is
worth a closer look:
[Plaintiff] BMI argues that "it is undisputed that Claire's
causes sounds to be received beyond the place where the
performance is initially received." This argument assumes
that the performance is initially received at the receiver and
then "further transmitted" via wire to other areas. Whatever
its technical merits, this view of "further transmission" is
contrary to the legislative history. The system in Aiken
consisted of a radio set connected, presumably by wires, to
four speakers. Congress intended such a system to be exempt
under § 110(5). Yet BMr's proposed rule would deny the
exemption to the store in Aiken. In addition, the statute uses
the term "receiving apparatus," which... encompasses not
just the receiver but all the components of an integrated music
system. It is sensible to consider that the entire receiving
apparatus, and not just the receiver, "receives" the
performance.
BMI refines its argument by suggesting that the fact that the
receiver is placed in a back room separate from the selling
area means that the music is further transmitted. This
argument also fails. The nature of the transmission does not
change because the speaker wire passes over or through a
14
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 4
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol11/iss2/4
CONGRESS TRIPS OVER ACT
wall. If Congress wanted the rule to be that the receiver must
be in the same room as the speaker for the exemption to apply,
it could easily have said so.
Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d at 1495 (citation omitted).
Arguably, however, Congress did say so, in the section 101 definition of
"transmit:" "To 'transmit' a performance or display is to communicate it by any
device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from
which they are sent." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. 2001). Read too literally,
this definition suggests that sending a signal from a receiver to a speaker just a
few feet away could be a "transmission." Surely this is not what Congress
intended. Compare Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Professional Real Estate
Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d 278 (9h Cir. 1989) (transmission that takes place
within a single room is not "received beyond the place from which it is sent")
with On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (transmission from one room in hotel to individual guest
rooms is "received beyond the place from which it is sent"). Read somewhat
less literally, however, the definition could justify distinguishing between a
receiver that is wired to speakers in the same room and a receiver that is wired
to speakers in another room. This distinction enables Professional Real Estate
Investors to be reconciled with On Command Video. It also makes a sort of
visceral sense; when section 110(5) was enacted in 1976, and arguably today as
well, a radio or television of a kind that is typically found in a person's home is
normally turned on for the entertainment of persons who are present in the same
room as the device. Once the signal can be received in several rooms at the
same time, as in On Command Video, the overall system begins to look more
like a commercial entertainment system. See generally Wilk, supra note 24, at
807-11 (analyzing different interpretations of "further transmitted");
McCluggage, supra note 21, at 12 (similar).
As an added complication, the term "receiving apparatus" has been widely
interpreted in the section 110(5) case law as including not just the receiver, but
also the speakers or monitors to which the receiver sends the signal. See supra
notes 22 and 23 (collecting cases); Will, supra note 24, at 802-03 (noting that
most courts use this term to refer to the entire system; but see National Football
League v. Ellicottville Gin Mill, Inc., 1995 WL 737935, *5 (W.D.N.Y. 1995)
(one of the few cases applying the term "receiving apparatus" to the receiver
alone, but relying on an erroneous reading of McBee & Bruno's, 792 F.2d at
731). See generally Heifer, supra note 21, at 191-95 (favoring private collective
licensing agreements over legislative solutions); Luh, supra note 24, at 727-34
(discussing both the scope of "receiving apparatus" and the concept of "further
transmission"). The broader interpretation of "receiving apparatus" was
explicitly adopted in Claire's Boutiques, 949 F.2d at 1493. If that interpretation
is correct, then even an apparatus that runs wires through walls to a
speaker/monitor would be a "single receiving apparatus," and the fact that the
wires run through walls would not indicate that a "further transmission" was
4112001]
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The Seventh Circuit, in refusing to consider factors other than
those explicitly listed in the statute, has noted that in all of the
previously decided cases holding the exemption inapplicable to
stores physically larger than the restaurant in Aiken, those courts
had also found that the equipment in question was not "of a kind
commonly found in private homes." 9 The Eighth Circuit, in
contrast, has observed that no previously decided cases have relied
solely on the defendant's financial situation, but has considered the
physical size of the store as relevant to determining whether the
system should be considered home-type. 30
III. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
As indicated above, the case law under section 110(5)
demonstrates that the scope of that exemption was far from clear,
leading to costly and repetitive litigation. Under pressure from
associations representing bars and restaurants, Congress began to
consider revising the exemption, and a number of bills were
introduced in the House and the Senate between 1994 and 1998.3'
Some of these proposals were simple expansions of the original
exemption, some so broad that there was little doubt they would
occurring, since sending the signal from the receiver to a speaker/monitor would
simply complete the initial act of receiving the transmission rather constitute a
new transmission. The term "single" in "single receiving apparatus"
presumably refers to the number of actual receivers rather than the number of
eakers or monitors, since even in Aiken the sound system had four speakers.
Edison Bros. Stores v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 954 F.2d 1419, 1424 (8th Cir.
1992). That observation applies to post-1992 cases as well. See Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Calvin's Furniture and Appliances, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7566,
at * 4-*10 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (stores with 5000 square feet open to public, and
between 9 and 30 speakers, were nonexempt regardless of whether the
appropriate test is limited to their receiving apparatus or considers the size of the
establishment as well).
30 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482, 1494 (7th
Cir. 1991) (fact that broadcast is audible only in a small area "strongly indicates
that the stereo system is of a kind commonly used in private homes;" it will
therefore be harder for larger establishments to qualify).
31 See Heifer, supra note 21, at 133-3 8 (tracing reform proposals from 103d
Congress to enactment of Pub. L. No. 105-298).
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have placed the United States in violation of its international treaty
obligations under the Berne Convention. 32  Others, however,
32 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris
1971). For example, H.R. 4936, 103d Cong. (introduced Aug. 19, 1994, by Sen.
Jack Reed, D-R.I.) and S. 2515, 103d Cong. (introduced Oct. 6, 1994, by Sen.
Hank Brown, R-Colo.,) would have replaced section 110(5) with a broad
exemption for performances by "television and radio sets located in a business
establishment unless a direct or indirect charge is made to see or hear the
transmission." See 140 Cong. Rec. 14470 (introduction of S. 2515); 48 PAT.
TRADEMARK& COPYRIGHT J. No. 1192, atp. 418 (Aug. 18, 1994); 48 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. No. 1192, p. 435 (text of H.R. 4936); 48 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. No. 1199, p. 659 (October 13, 1994). In the next
Congress, House and Senate bills would have amended section 110(5) to
exempt any television and radio performances that are "incidental to the main
purpose of the establishment." H.R. 789, 104th Cong. (Rep. James
Sensenbrenner, R-Wis., introduced Feb. 1995); S. 1137, 104 th Cong., (Sen.
Craig Thomas, R-Wyo., introduced Aug. 9, 1995); see 51 PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. No. 1270, p. 612 (Mar. 21, 1996); 51 PAT. TRADEMARK&
COPYRIGHT J. No. 1271, p. 637 (Mar. 28, 1996). At a hearing on July 17, 1997,
United States Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters criticized H.R. 789
because it would have eliminated the ban on "further transmission" as well as
the limitation requiring use of a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly
used in private homes. 54 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. No. 1336, p. 237
(July 24, 1997). Peters argued that the need for such a broadened exemption
had not been established. Id. Both Peters and Robert Stoll, Legislative Affairs
Administrator for the United States Patent and Trademark Office, cautioned that
H.R. 789 would violate the Berne Convention and could lead to challenges
under the TRIPs provisions of the WTO Agreement. Id.
Commentators were divided. Compare Matthew Clarke, Fairness in Music
Licensing Act of 1997: Will it End the Confusion Surrounding the Homestyle
Exemption of the Copyright Act?, 8 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. LAW 141
(1997) (arguing in favor of H.R. 789); David M. Lilenfeld, Why Congress
Should Eliminate the Multiple Performance Doctrine, 58 OHIO ST. L. J. 695,
725-28 (1997) (arguing in favor of a total exemption for radio and television
broadcasts to customers); and Luh, supra note 24, at 736-39 (arguing in favor of
the broad exemption proposed in H.R. 789, 104 th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced
Feb. 2, 1995)) with McCluggage, supra note 21, at 47 (arguing that section
110(5)(B) violates TRIPs); Helfer, supra note 21, at 141-47 (arguing that section
110(5)(B) violates TRIPs and Berne); and M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 8.18 [2][e] (criticizing section 110(5)(B) both as poor policy
and as a violation of Berne and TRIPs).
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promised greater clarity and predictability, together with a more
modest expansion of the scope of the exemption.
33
A. The Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998
In the 1998 Fairness in Music Licensing Act,34 Congress finally
revised the old "homestyle exemption." However, rather than
33 For example, S. 1628, 104 th Cong. (1996) (introduced Mar. 20, 1996 by Sen.
Hank Brown, R-Colo.), would have exempted businesses smaller than 5000
square feet, using 10 or fewer speakers, if their annual revenues fell below a
statutorily-prescribed maximum and there was no direct admission charge or
further transmission to the public. See McCluggage, supra note 21, at 43-44
(endorsing S. 1628). Taking a different approach, S. 1619, 104e h Cong. (Sen.
Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, introduced March 15, 1996), would have preserved the
existing section 110(5) exemption for all works other than nondramatic musical
works. With respect to the latter category, S. 1619 would have allowed
performances of musical compositions by "a small commercial establishment,"
a term that was to be defined not by statute but by regulations that would be
issued by the United States Copyright Office according to "specific, verifiable
criteria" identified in the bill: (1) the area of the establishment, (2) the kind,
number, and location of devices used, (3) gross revenues, (4) the number of
employees, and (5) other relevant factors. In introducing S. 1619, Senator
Hatch stated the intent was to use the same factors courts had found relevant
under the old homestyle exemption, but to allow for greater flexibility in
response to technological change, and more careful balancing of the interests of
copyright owners and business establishments, by giving the Copyright Office
the power to define the scope of the exemption. In addition, section 2(b)(2) of
the bill specified that any definition developed by the Copyright Office must
"not result in an exemption to the right of public performance or to the right of
public display the scope of which exceeds that permitted under the international
treaty obligations of the United States." Senator Hatch noted that this provision
was designed to address concerns, raised by the Copyright Office and the United
States Patent and Trademark Office, that the broader exemptions proposed in
H.R. 789 and S. 1137, see supra note 31, would violate US obligations under
Berne. Cong. Rec. 3/15/96, p. S2192.; see 51 PAT. TRADEMARK& COPYRIGHT
J. No. 1270 ("Text" section) (Mar. 21, 1996) (text of S. 1619 and introductory
remarks of Sen. Hatch); 51 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. No. 1270, p. 612
(Mar. 21, 1996); 51 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. No. 1271, p. 637 (Mar.
28, 1996).34 Pub. L. No. 105-298, 105 th Cong., 2d Sess., 112 Stat. 2830 (1998), codified at
17 U.S.C. § 110(B)(5) (2001).
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merely clarifying and modernizing the language of section 110(5),
Congress left the old language virtually intact but added a safe
harbor provision that encompasses a far greater number of
commercial establishments than could ever have availed
themselves of the old exemption.35 The 1998 amendment, which
appears at 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B) (and redesignates the old section
110(5) exemption as new section 110(5)(A)), creates a safe harbor
for audio or audiovisual public performances of non-dramatic
musical works at commercial establishments based on specific
guidelines addressing the size of the establishment and the nature
of the equipment used.36 The safe harbor, widely known as the
"Sensenbrenner amendment, 3 7 has the effect of exempting the
3 5 See infra note 37-38. The amendment also contained much-needed
provisions addressing the remedies available to venue operators who complain
of abusive tactics by the performing rights societies. Pub. L. No. 105-298, Title
II, § 203(a), 112 Stat. 2831 (Oct. 27, 1998), as amended by Pub. L. No. 106-44,
§ l(c)(1), 113 Stat. 221 (Aug. 5, 1999) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 513 (2001)); see
Heifer, supra note 21, at 116-19 (discussing these complaints).36 The 1998 amendments, and subsequent technical amendments in 1999,
revised section 110 by redesignating the existing language (supra note 15) as
section 110(5)(A), inserting at the beginning of that provision the phrase
"except as provided in subparagraph (B)," redesignating old subsections (A) and
(B) as (i) and (ii), and adding a new (and lengthy) subsection (B), which
exempts public performances of licensed transmissions of nondramatic musical
works, if there is no direct charge or further transmission, provided that the
establishment conforms either to certain statutory square footage restrictions or
to certain statutory restrictions on the number and size of performance devices
(loudspeakers or audiovisual devices). See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B) (2001)
(setting forth those statutory restrictions in detail), as amended by Pub. L. No.
105-298, Title II, § 202, 105& Cong., 2d Sess., 112 Stat. 2830 (1998), and Pub.
L. No.106-44, § l(a), 106"' Cong., 1st Sess., 113 Stat. 221 (1999) (technical
amendments).37 The Sensenbrenner amendment is traceable to H.R. 789, 105"h Cong.
(introduced Feb. 1997 by Rep. James Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.), the House
counterpart to S. 28, 105'h Cong., introduced Jan. 30, 1997 by Sen. Strom
Thurmond (R-S.C.). A modified version of H.R. 789 was included in H.R.
2589. See 57 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. No. 1399, at 9 (Nov. 5, 1998).
H.R. 2589 broadened the 110(5) exemption to performances of nondramatic
musical works by "electronic device[s]" in the case of businesses no larger than
3500 square feet and with only 6 speakers or 2 televisions. See 55 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. No. 1369, at 466, 479 (Mar. 26, 1998). The
House passed H.R. 2589 in March 1998. See Cong. Rec. (Mar. 25, 1998), at
2001] 415
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majority of bars and restaurants in the United States from liability
for such performances.
38
Specifically, section 110(5)(B) exempts all smaller
establishments (bars and restaurants under 3750 square feet, and
other stores under 2000 square feet) that play licensed broadcasts
for their customers regardless of the type of sound system
employed. With respect to larger establishments, a business of any
size can fit within the exemption so long as it uses no more than 6
loudspeakers (no more than 4 per room), and, in the case of
audiovisual works, no more than 4 audiovisual devices (up to 55
inches diagonal screen size, and no more than one screen per
room). The new safe harbor retains the rule that there must be no
direct admission charge to hear the transmission. However, it
loosens the "no further transmission" rule by prohibiting only
further transmission of a broadcast "beyond the establishment
where it is received," in contrast to section 110(5)(A), which
retains the prior rule that there can be no further transmission "to
the public."
Thus, while the new safe harbor sets fairly specific limits in
terms of square footage and the permissible number of speakers
and/or audiovisual devices, thereby eliminating much of the
ambiguity of the old homestyle exemption, the effect of the new
provisions is nonetheless to dramatically broaden the scope of the
exemption for public performances of nondramatic musical works.
Because of the more generous rules on square footage and the
number of speakers, and the loosening of the "further transmitted"
rule, many of the establishments which were held to be non-
exempt under the original homestyle exemption would probably
H1456; 55 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. No. 1369, at 466, 479 (Mar. 26,
1998). However, the exemption in H.R. 2589 was narrower than the exemption
that was finally incorporated in S. 505 and then enacted as Pub. L. No. 105-298.
56 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. No. 1396, at 696 (Oct. 15, 1998).
38 A 1999 study by Dun & Bradstreet (commissioned by the American Society
of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP)) estimated that 70% of bars
and restaurants qualify for the safe harbor, as do 45% of retail establishments.
WTO Adopts Ruling that U.S. Law on Music Licensing Violates TRIPS, 60 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., No. 1485, at 282 (Aug. 4, 2000).
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have satisfied the new safe harbor.39 Yet nothing in the history of
the homestyle exemption and the proposals to reform
demonstrated a need for a broader exemption -- only for a clearer
one.
Testimony at the hearings on the Sensenbrenner amendment
reveals quite clearly that the primary purpose of the amendment
was to allow more businesses to publicly perform music
39 For example, the Gap store held to be nonexempt in Sailor Music (discussed
at note 22, supra) would have passed muster under section 110(5)(B), because it
used only four speakers. Other cases which would have come out differently
include: Gnossos Music v. Di Pompo, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1539, Copy. L.
Rep. (CCI) P26,483, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15988, *13-*14 (D. Maine 1989)
(restaurant with 1824 square feet open to the public, and seating capacity of
172, was too large compared to Aiken; sound system was too commercial, with
eight to ten speakers; music was further transmitted from one room to speakers
in other rooms; and defendant had previously subscribed to commercial music
service); Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mont. 1990)
(restaurant with seating area of 1192 square feet, with the transmission audible
in an area of 880 square feet and seating capacity of 120 persons was too large,
compared to 620 square feet of public area in Aiken; sound system was also
commercial in nature, with five speakers; sound was "further transmitted" to
public rooms other than the room where the receiver was located; court
indicated revenues would be relevant but defendant did not supply any financial
data); Merrill v. Bill Miller's Bar-B-Q Enterprises, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1172,
1175-76 (W.D. Tex. 1988) (chain of 36 restaurants was not exempt where each
store had 1000-1500 square feet of dining space, seating space for 100-125
people, and more than $500,000 in average annual gross revenues; entire chain
had over $30 million in annual gross revenues; receiving apparatus was not
home-type, but used only two speakers; broadcast was "further transmitted" to
other rooms; and chain was large enough to justify subscription to commercial
music service); International Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 665 F. Supp. 652,
656-58 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (nightclub was not exempt where it had at least 2,640
square feet, annual net profits of $35,000 to $136,000, seating capacity of 200,
and commercial sound system with eight speakers, and where the transmissions
were further transmitted to the public through wiring from a private office to the
public areas of the establishment), affd 855 F.2d 375 (7h Cir. 1988). Ironically,
one of the few decisions that found the old exemption applicable would also
come out differently. See Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, 602 F. Supp. 1113,
1118-1119 (M.D.N.C. 1985) (miniature golf course covering 7500 square feet
was exempt; it was not large enough to justify subscription to commercial music
service because it was open only 6 months a year, rarely had revenues of more
than $1000 a month, and used a sound system, with six outdoor speakers, that
was not very audible due to the size and outdoor setting of the golf course).
20011
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broadcasts for their patrons without paying royalties to copyright
owners. Proponents of the amendment spoke almost exclusively
of the benefits to the businesses that wanted to use these
broadcasts, and minimized the detriments to copyright owners.40
They were silent on the rationale for allowing businesses to use
such large amounts of intellectual property without compensating
the owners. Opponents of the bill noted the absence of any
attempt to justify this transfer of wealth away from copyright
owners,41 and warned that the proposed exemption would probably
violate the United States' international treaty obligations under the
TRIPs provisions of the WTO Agreement.42 Ironically, the new
40 Here are a few examples:
Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, of Wisconsin: "This bill is a victory for
small business and a tribute to the commitment of its supporters.... [The
amendment] had the strong endorsement of groups, including the
National Federation of Independent Business and the National Restaurant
Association." 144 Cong. Rec. H9946-01, *H9949.
Rep. Jackson-Lee of Texas: "[W e have recognized the importance of
our small businesses like restaurants, like various other centers who
need to have the ability to create and improve their enjoyment." Id.
41 Rep. Nadler of New York, a member of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, asked: "What showing of necessity have we here? Restaurants that
pay an average of $400 a year in music licensing fees, a rather small, I would
say minute percentage of the revenues of an average restaurant, do not want to
pay the $400 a year to the songwriters. Well, that is interesting. Let them try to
negotiate a different deal. Or let them not use the music. But what necessity,
what public interest is served by the government coming in and making a
decision and saying 'Thou shalt not pay the $400; you shall get it free?'
"Is there a great housing shortage that necessitates rent control? Is there a great
shortage of restaurant musicians or of restaurant radios that necessitates that, my
God, if we do not pass this bill, people are not going to be able to eat because
they will be so nervous without the radio music as to justify the government
intervention in the free market here, to come in and say, 'We're not going to let
you make this deal, we're going to upset the licensing arrangements."' Id. at
*119950.42 The Clinton Administration strongly opposed the broadened exemption
because of these concerns. Id. at H9952-54, See, e.g., Richard W. Fisher,
Acting U.S. Trade Representative (Letter to Congresswoman Mary Bono, Aug.
26, 1998): "If this legislation is passed, we believe that our trading partners will
argue that it violates our international obligations under the WTO Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights." Id. at *119952. See also
William M. Daley, Sec'y of Commerce (Letter to Speaker Newt Gingrich,
418 [Vol. xi:397
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safe harbor provisions were included in the same bill that added
twenty years to all subsisting federal copyrights -- the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act43 -- and which was touted as an
essential step toward strengthening the rights of United States
copyright owners. In a double irony, the late Rep. Bono himself,
in whose honor the Act was named, had himself opposed the effort
to broaden the scope of the section 110(5) exemption.44 And,
since all good ironies should come in threes, it is worth noting that
the international treaty provisions cited by the bill's opponents --
the TRIPs provisions of the WTO Agreement - were partly the
result of the United States' continuing crusade to encourage other
nations to increase their levels of intellectual property protection
for the benefit of American exports. It was hardly a surprise, then,
that foreign copyright owners almost immediately challenged the
broadened public performance exemption as a violation of those
treaty provisions.
B. The WTO Dispute Panel Decision
In the summer of 2000, responding to a complaint by the
European Union on behalf of the Irish Music Rights Organization,
House of Rep., Mar. 20, 1998), Id. at *H9952; Bruce A. Lehman, Asst. Sec'y of
Commerce and Com'r of Patent and Trademarks (Letter to Hon. Howard Coble,
Chair, Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, Committee on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives, Jan. 16, 1998), Id. at *H9953;
McCluggage, supra note [21], at 16 (discussing July 17, 1997 hearings on H.R.
789), William M. Daley, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Letter to Rep.
Mary Bono opposing H.R. 789 and its incorporation in H.R. 2589 and S. 505),
56 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. No. 1396, at 731 (Oct. 15, 1998).43 Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
44 Rep. Bono expressed his opposition to an early version of H.R. 789 at a May
8, 1996 hearing by the House Small Business Committee, citing his unusual
perspective as both a songwriter and a restauranteur. See 52 PAT. TRADEMARK
& COPYRIGHT J. No. 1278, at 72 (May 16, 1996). He also expressed his
concerns in a letter sent to Bruce Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks. See 144 Cong. Rec. at *H9952-53;
56 PAT. TRADEMARK& COPYRIGHT J. No. 1396, at 731 (Oct. 15, 1998). Rep.
Mary Bono continued to voice these concerns when she succeeded her late
husband in the House, citing the damage to the rights by songwriters as well as
the violation of international treaty obligations. See 144 Cong. Rec. at *H9952.
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a World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Panel ruled that
section 110(5)(B) violates Articles 9 and 13 of the TRIPs (Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) provisions of the
WTO Agreement (also known as the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, or "GATT"), 45 because it created too broad an
exception to the public performance right in musical compositions,
a right which Article 9.1 of TRIPs requires all WTO countries to
guarantee to the owners of such copyrighted works.46  The
requirements of Article 9.1 are subject to exceptions only in
"certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the right holder," 47 an exception which the
Panel found inapplicable in this case.
However, the Panel rejected a similar challenge to the newly
amended section 110(5)(A), concluding that the scope of the
section 110(5)(A) privilege was sufficiently narrow that it did not
unreasonably prejudice the rights of copyright holders. 48
However, in the pursuit of this favorable ruling, the United States'
representatives advanced a narrow interpretation of section
110(5)(A), suggesting that the 1998 revisions of section 110(5)
had the effect of narrowing the scope of subsection (A) so that it
45 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
Legal Instruments -- Results of the Uruguay Round, vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 1197,
1201 (1994) (hereinafter TRIPs).
46 WTO, Report of the Panel, United States - Section 110(5) of the U.S.
Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R, 2000 WL 816081 (June 15, 2000) (adopted by
WTO Dispute Settlement Body on July 27, 2000) (hereinafter Panel Report).
Article 9.1 of TRIPs incorporates most of the 1971 Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Article 1 lbis(1) of which requires
member countries to protect the exclusive rights of authors with respect to
broadcasts or public performances of their works, including, inter alia, musical
compositions. For a detailed discussion of the pertinent provisions of Berne and
TRIPs, see McCluggage, supra note [21], at 19-36 (arguing that section
11 O(B)(5) violates these provisions); Heifer, supra note 21, at 142-85 (similar);
Lydia Pallas Loren, Paying the Piper, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 231, .
256-65 (1999) (arguing that section 110(5)(B) does not violate either Berne or
TRPs).47 TRIPs, Art. 13.
48 Panel Report, supra note 45, at *40.
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applies only to works other than nondramatic musical works. 49
Pre-1998 case law had routinely applied the homestyle exemption
(that is, the version that predated the 1998 amendments) to
transmissions of nondramatic musical works, and, indeed, such
works were the subject of the vast majority of those cases.5 0
However, the insertion of the prefatory "except as" language in
subsection (A), coupled with the broad safe harbor in subsection
(B), does seem to make subsection (A) largely irrelevant for
establishments that perform nondramatic musical works, since it
appears that most performances of such works that would be
exempt under subsection (A) will also be exempt under the safe
harbor of subsection (B). Thus, the safe harbor effectively
eliminates the need for most potential defendants to invoke
subsection (A) with respect to unauthorized performances of
nondramatic musical works. It remains at least theoretically
possible, however, that certain performances of broadcast works
could fall outside subsection (B) yet qualify under subsection (A)
if the latter is interpreted to include nondramatic musical works.51
Thus, while the narrow interpretation of subsection (A) may have
no support in the legislative history of the 1998 amendments, and
only ambiguous support in the statutory language, it may reflect
the reality that subsection (A) henceforward has very little
application to popular music.
If Congress does not repeal or amend section 110(5)(B) in order
to bring the United States into compliance with TRIPs, the WTO
may authorize trade sanctions against the United States. Although
the WTO originally imposed a deadline of July 27, 2001, for the
49 Id. at *39.
50 E.g., Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini, 55 F.3d 263, 265 n.5 (7 h Cir. 1995)
(listing various pop tumes allegedly infringed by the defendant restaurant);
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482, 1484 n.2 (7±
Cir. 1991) (similar), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 911, 112 S.Ct. 1942, 118 L.Ed.2d
547 (1992).
51 Lydia Loren poses the example of someone playing a "boom box" in public,
Loren, supra note 45, at 239-40 n.30; David Nimmer envisions a bar greater
than 3750 square feet, with a single television screen greater than 55 inches, M.
NIMMER& D. NIMMER, supra note 31, at § 8.18[c][i]. While Professor Loren's
example probably would constitute fair use, surely a potential defendant in these
circumstances should be entitled to rely on a less elusive doctrine.
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United States to amend section 110(5) to eliminate the conflict
with Article 13,52 it extended that deadline until the end of the
current session of Congress or December 31, 2001, whichever is
earlier.53 In light of the terrorist activities of September 11, 2001,
and the military and security-related concerns now demanding the
attention of Congress and the Administration, it seems unlikely
that the United States will meet this extended deadline.
The United States and the European Union submitted to binding
arbitration to determine the amount of annual trade sanctions to
which the United States would be subject of it failed to amend
section 110(5)(B) by the agreed deadline, and, on November 9,
2001, the arbitrators set that figure at $1.08 million.54
IV. CONCLUSION
The section 110(5)(B) safe harbor is a far cry from the limited
exemption recognized in Aiken and the 1976 Act. Although
consumer entertainment technology has changed a great deal since
1976, so that the notion of what constitutes "homestyle"
equipment certainly warrants updating, there was no need for
Congress to create such an expansive safe harbor.55 The WTO
52 WTO, Award of the Arbitrator, United States - Section 110(5) of the U.S.
Copyright Act, WT/DS160/12, 2001 WL 32556 (Jan. 15, 2001).
5 WTO, Action by the Dispute Settlement Body, WT/DSB/M/107 (July 24,
2001) (adopting U.S. proposal contained in WT/DS160/14, 2001 WL 810146
July 18, 2001)).
4 WTO, Communication from the Permanent Mission of the United States and
the Permanent Delegation of the European Commission, United States Section
110(5) of the US. Copyright Act, WT/DS160/15, 2001 WL 874574 (Aug. 3,
2001); WTO, Note by the Secretariat of the United States Section 110(5) of the
U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS160/16,2001 WL 903421 (Aug. 13, 2001); WTO,
Award of the Arbitrators: United States-Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright
Act, WT/DS160/ARB25/1, 2000 WL 1397425 (Nov. 9, 2001)(setting the figure
at $1.08 million per year).55 The breadth of the exemption seems to reflect the political clout of the
hospitality industry. After ASCAP and BMI reached an agreement with the
National Licensed Beverage Association which would have exempted all
establishments under 3500 square feet, the National Restaurant Association
rejected this agreement even though it would have exempted almost 70 percent
of the restaurants and taverns in the country. See May 8, 1996 hearing on H.R.
[Vol. xi:397422
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Dispute Panel decision provides Congress an opportunity to
correct this mistake while enjoying some "political cover." Very
few countries provide such a broad exemption from public
performance rights in broadcast music. 56 Updating and clarifying
the exemption should be possible without expanding it
significantly beyond the scope envisioned by the 1976 Congress.
Conversely, if there is a good argument for expanding the
exemption -- other than the argument that businesses would simply
prefer not to pay for music -- that argument has yet to be heard.
If section 110(5)(B) is repealed as a result of the WTO decision,
Congress will have to consider the effect of this repeal on the
scope of the original homestyle exemption that is currently
embodied in section 110(5)(A). A simple repeal of the subsection
(B) safe harbor will once again make it necessary to include
nondramatic musical works in subsection (A), thus largely
restoring the pre-1998 homestyle exemption. It seems likely,
however, that rather than revert to the 1976 provisions, Congress
will attempt another overhaul and updating of that exemption in
order to provide clearer guidelines to bars, restaurants, and other
establishments. This time, however, Congress should take a more
policy-oriented approach, balancing the reasonable entitlements of
copyright owners against the reasonable expectations of users,
rather than simply surrendering to pressure from hotels,
restaurants, and retailers.
Replacing the former section 110(5) with clearer guidelines
should not be that difficult. Because the nature of the "receiving
apparatus" was outcome-determinative in almost all of the old
section 110(5) cases, an apparatus-oriented safe harbor may offer
the most practicable approach. Alternatively, the guidelines could
simply specify the maximum square footage of the establishment,
setting that figure low enough to prevent the exemption from
"swallowing the rule." Limitations based on square footage, or on
789, 104' Cong., 52 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. No. 1278, p. 72 (May
16, 1996).
56 See Heifer, supra note 21, at 171-85 (comparing laws of other nations and
concluding that very few have exemptions as broad as 110(5)(B)); McCluggage,
supra note [21], at 37-39 (comparing foreign laws and reaching similar
conclusion).
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measurable volume and/or number of speakers, would appear to
provide a good proxy for the "small commercial establishment"
that was apparently intended to be the original beneficiary of the
exemption in 1976. For example, it hardly seems likely that stores
as large as the Gap or Casual Comer would settle for a 2-speaker
radio system; thus, those establishments would likely opt to pay
for a music license.
If such a narrow exemption seems niggardly to some, others
might ask why there should be any exemption at all.57 Surely the
only reason for carving out such an exemption to the valuable
public performance right is to avoid inconvenience and expense
where the public enjoyment of broadcast music bears little or no
relationship to the revenue-generating activities of a business. If a
business finds it at all beneficial to play music for customers on a
high-quality sound system, then where is the unfairness in asking
the business to pay a reasonable price value for that service? The
alternative of collecting additional royalties from broadcasters
would be difficult to administer, and would require developing a
formula that takes account of the size and profitability of this
remote "business" audience. It may be, therefore, that Congress
should opt for the more direct approach -- allowing performing
rights societies to negotiate directly with the business audience
with respect to all but the most de minimus (e.g., two-speaker)
sound systems or establishments (based on square footage). The
hospitality and retail industries, however, can be expected to exert
considerable pressure to replace section 1l10(5)(B) with as
generous an exemption as possible. For those in Congress who
have difficulty saying "no" to these industries, the World Trade
Organization may have handed them the answer to their woes,
along with an opportunity to recapture the minimalist spirit of the
original homestyle exemption.
57 Professor Heifer, in fact, has argued that privately negotiated licensing
agreements would be superior to any legislative exemption. Heifer, supra note
[21], at 191-95.
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